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INSURANCE RETALIATORY LAWS
George A. Pelletier, Jr.*
Introduction
Although insurance may have been considered "essentially local" at one time
this is no longer true, for it is a business carried on across state lines with increasing
frequency.' Due to the desire of states to protect their citizens from undue discrimination when doing business in another state, retaliatory statutes have been
enacted attempting to provide protection for domestic insurance companies. The
retaliatory statutes demand equality of treatment for insurance companies of one
state when they do business in a foreign state, and impose the same burdens and
exactions on insurance companies from the foreign state if this equality is refused.
A retaliatory statute simply says to other states: "We will meet you on the basis
of equality and comity, and will treat you as you treat us."'
Retaliatory statutes vary in detail in the forty-five states in which they have
been adopted, but they are basically alike.'
* First Lieutenant, United States Army Judge Advocate General's Corps. Member of
the Staff and Faculty, The Army Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia;
B.B.A., LL.B., Notre Dame; LL.M., Harvard; member of the State Bar of Texas. The
author wishes to acknowledge his gratitude to Professor Robert E. Keeton of the Harvard
Law School for his encouragement and advice in the preparation of this paper.
1 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U.S. 1868).
2 Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 480, 482 (1883).
3 ALA.CODE tit. 51, § 825 (1940); ApRz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-230 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 66-2225 (Supp. 1961); CAL. INS. CODE § 685-685.4 (Supp.) (Cal. Rev. & Tax
Code §§ 12281-12290 (Supp.) specifies procedure for the collection of the retaliatory tax);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-14 (Perm. Supp. 1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. Rxv. §§ 12-211
(Supp. 1962), 38-22 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2709 (Supp. 1962); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 624.0228 (1960); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-321 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1011
(1961); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, § 1056 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1963); IND. ANN. STAT. §395012 (1952); IOWA CODE ANN. § 505.14 (Supp. 1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 40-253
(Supp. 1961); Ky. REV. STAT. § 304.110 (1960); LA. REv. STAT. § 22:1079 (1959); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 60, § 53 (Supp. 1963); MD.ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 61 (Supp. 1963);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 175, § 159 (1959); MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 24.1430, 24.1476
(1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 71.23 (Supp. 1963); Mo.ANN. STAT. § 375.450 (Supp. 1963);
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The Texas statute is representative:
Whenever by the laws of any other state or territory of the
United States any taxes, licenses, fees, fines, penalties, deposit requirements or other obligations, prohibitions or restrictions are imposed upon any insurance company organized in this State and
licensed and actually doing business in such other state or territory
which, in the aggregate are inexcess of the aggregate of taxes, licenses, fees, fines, penalties, deposit requirements or other obligations,
prohibitions or restrictions directly imposed upon a similar insurance
company of such other state or territory doing business in this State,
the Board of Insurance Commissioners of this State shall impose upon
any similar company of such state or territory in the same manner
and for the same purpose, the same taxes, licenses, fees, fines, penalties, deposit requirements or other obligations, prohibitions or restrictions; provided, however, the aggregate of taxes, licenses, fees, fines,
penalties, or other obligations imposed by this State pursuant to this
(statute) on an insurance company of another state or territory shall
not exceed the aggregate of such charges imposed by such other state
or territory on a similar insurance company of this State actually
licensed and doing business therein . . . provided, further, that for

the purpose of this Section, an alien insurer shall be deemed a company of the State designated by it wherein it has (a) established its
principal office or agency in the United States, or (b) maintains the
largest amount of its assets held in trust or on deposit for the security

of it policyholders or policyholders and creditors in the United States,
or (c) in which it was admitted to do business in the United States.
The provisions of this Section shall not apply to ad valorem taxes
or real or personal property or to personal income taxes.
The provisions of this Act shall not apply to a company of any
other state doing business in this State if fifteen per cent (15%) or
more of the voting stock of said company is owned by a corporation.
organized under the laws of this State, and domiciled in this
State....
Despite wide enactment and the usual problems of interpretation giving
rise to litigation, fairly little has been written concerning the nature and interMONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 40-2826 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 44-149 to -153 (1960);
N.H. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §§ 405:53-59 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT. § 17:32-15 (1963); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 58-5-27,-49 (1953); N.Y. INS. LAWS § 61; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-152 (1960); N.D.
REv. CODE § 26-01-05 (1960); OHIo RE V. CODE ANN. § 3905.41 (Page 1954) (see also the

reciprocal provision for retaliatory laws applicable to mutual insurance companies in §
3941.25); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 628 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 736.237 (1961); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 27-2-17 (1956); S.C. CODE § 37-132 (1962); S.D. CODE § 31.1112
(Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-309 (Supp. 1963); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.46
(1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-14-9 (Supp. 1963); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3367 (1958);

VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-87 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.14.040 (1961); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3323 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 76.35-36 (1957); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. 26-45

(1957).

Any reference hereafter to a state's retaliatory statute is to the statute cited above.
Several of the statutes are quite limited in scope. The Idaho and New Mexico statutes
retaliate only on agent or broker licensing. The North Carolina statute is also relatively ineffective for by another statute (N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.8 (1960)) it is inapplicable to
taxes. The Alabama statute is considered unconstitutional and not in use. See the section
entitled Effectiveness, infra, pp. 268-69.
Besides its retaliatory insurance law, New Jersey has a general retaliatory statute applicable
to all out-of-state corporations. N.J. REv. STAT. § 14:15-5 (1939).
California is the only state to have its retaliatory statute specifically authorized in the state
constitution. CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 14 4/5.
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pretation of retaliatory statutes." Although the problems generated by retaliatory statutes are not as numerous as they once were, (a result of the expanded
coverage of the statutes), many troublesome questions remain.
I.

NATURE AND PURPOSE

The legal rights of primitive man were grounded in his right to avenge
or retaliate by a return in kind for the evil done to him -an
eye for an eye,
a tooth for a tooth. The English common law was formed during a period when
retaliation was still a prime rule of law. On the eve of the Norman Conquest,the crude form of criminal law practiced in England permitted a blood-feud
whereby the kin of a slain person could avenge his death by killing the slayer
and taking his belongings.5 A case as late as 1221 is reported in which a man
who had wounded another underwent a similar mutilation by order of the court.'
Retribution of this sort was in time supplanted by greater reliance on payments
of money for such wrongs.
Strict retaliation has now almost completely disappeared from domestic
law except in the case of capital punishment for murder. Nevertheless it retains
a special niche in international relations, undoubtedly due to the lack of adequate
legal institutions capable of settling disputes and preserving order between
nations." Similarly the threat of retaliation has been used as a club between the
various states of the nation to encourage a desired course of action by other
states. The states have enacted retaliatory statutes pertaining to decedents'
estates, registration and taxation of motor. vehicles, licensing and taxation of
liquor and most notably, of course, out-of-state corporations."
Retaliatory statutes are defensive in nature for they seek to protect residents
of the state from undue impositions in other states. For example, the theory of
the insurance retaliatory statutes is that foreign insurance companies doing
business in the home state shall suffer the same burdens as domestic .insurance
companies doing business in the foreign state. This can be achieved by the
statutes in either of two ways -reciprocity
or retaliation. Reciprocity denotes
4 Felton, Retaliatory Insurance Taxation, October 1961 BEST'S FIRE & CAS. NEWS 81;
Leavey, Retaliatory Laws in the United States Relating to Insurance, 1953 INS. L.J. 108;
Seitz, Retaliatory Insurance Tax Law Discriminatory Against Domestic Companies Within
Enforcing State, 18 NEB. L. BUL. 150 (1939); Annot., 91 A.L.R. 795 (1934); Note, A Review
of the Retaliatory Laws, 6 S.C.L.Q. 221 (1953); Note, Retaliatory Taxation of Insurance
Companies, 27 VA. L. Rlv. 686 (1941); See also 17 FLETCHER GYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §
8461 (perm. ed. rev. 1960); id. at v. 18, § 8802 (1955); 19 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW &
PRACTICE § 10352 (1946); PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED
STATES 106-08 (1927).
5 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 450-51 (2d ed. 1898).
6 Id. at 488.
7
The existence of the doctrine of retaliation is a reflection both of the

absence of law enforcing machinery in international law and of the desire of
states to justify their acts by an appeal to the support of its tenets. On the
one hand, it is a method by which one state may force another to cease its
transgressions against the law. On the other it provides justification on legal
grounds for acts ordinarily illegal . . . . [Tiheir legality is claimed to arise
from the appropriateness as responses to the prior illegalities of another state,
the original lawbreaker having refused to give satisfaction for its wrongs or

to end its wrongful practice.
COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

8

1 (1948).

See Starr, Reciprocal & Retaliatory Legislation in the American States, 21 MINN. L.

REv. 371 (1937); Note, Reciprocal & Retaliatory Statutes, 43 HARV. L. REv. 641 (1929);
Recent Decision, 40 MINN. L. REv. 508 (1956).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
a relation between two states which exists when each accords to citizens of the
other certain privileges, on condition that its citizens also enjoy similar privileges
at the hanls of the other state. It is the return of a favor for a favor. On the
other hand, as we have seen, retaliation is a return of disfavor with disfavor.
The insurance retaliatory statute is, at least in part, reciprocal for it says
"that while we welcome all insurance corporations of other states to the transaction of business within our limits, we insist upon a like welcome elsewhere. .

. ."'

Assuming Texas is the base state, reciprocity results when the

burdens of foreign states are no greater than those imposed by Texas on insurers
from thes6 states. But, if the burdens in any state are greater, Texas retaliates
by imposing the same burdens on insurers from that state on their business in
Texas - in effect applying the insurance laws of the other state. For instance,
suppose another state imposes a four per cent tax on premiums earned in that
state by foreign life insurance companies, whereas the rate in Texas is three
and three-tenths per cent. If the other state chooses to accept the reciprocity
offered by the statute it will lower its rate to three and three-tenths per cent.
Otherwise, Texas will retaliate (other fees and burdens being equal) by the
imposition of a four per cent rate against the premiums earned in Texas by
the-life insurers of the other state. Thus, the value of the reciprocal function is
properly the antithesis of the use of the retaliatory function - the less retaliation
the greater the reciprocal function has succeeded. Reciprocity is certainly more
desirable than retaliation and should be the preferred result of the use of the
statute, although it be a coercive result due to the threat of retaliation. However, even the reciprocal concept of a return of a favor for a favor carries with
it the coerciveness of refusing to grant this favor if the other side will not likewise grant it."0
In all retaliatory statutes except that of Wisconsin, the reciprocal function
is not complete, for the statutes serve only to increase the burden on the foreign
insurer to equal that imposed on the retaliating state's insurers doing business
in that foreign state. The Wisconsin statute, however, provides for a proportionate reduction in the burden imposed on foreign insurers when the burdens
imposed on Wisconsin insurers in the foreign state are less than Wisconsin
would normally impose on foreign insurers. Ohio also has a reciprocal provision

9 Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 480, 482 (1883).
10 Professor Patterson in his classic work, The Insurance Commissioner in the United
States (1927) states at 107 that retaliatory statutes are often "euphemistically" termed a
"reciprocal" or "comity" provision. He further states:
It may be confidently asserted that they were passed at the instigation of
domestic insurers, for the purpose of erecting a sort of tariff wall around the
state; and that they did not benefit the insuring public, however much they
may have increased the state's revenues. At the same time the retaliatory
law was a weapon with which to attack the high tariff walls of other states.
The type of tariff wall that Professor Patterson means is a conditional one which will come
down, or rather not be imposed, if Texas (the base state) insurers doing business in another
state are not made to bear burdens in excess of those imposed by Texas on insurers of that
other state. This view of the statute is entirely one of retaliation and does not take into consideration the reciprocal feature of the statute. As suggested above, the retaliatory statute is
not purely retaliatory in nature for its purpose of protecting the domestic insurer doing business
in another state is equally served if retaliation is not necessary, that is the burdens are equal
or the other state reduces its burdens to an equal level.
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but it is limited to application of retaliatory laws on mutual insurance companies.
Retaliatory statutes are not generally considered to be revenue .measures,
any increase in revenue being purely incidental to the regulatory. function.1 '
However, if the state has few domestic companies, the statute may be more
important as a revenue-producing measure than as protection for domestic
companies doing business in other states.
The retaliatory statutes in net effect tend to place a ceiling upon the rate
of taxation which any state can apply to foreign insurance companies. Now
that retaliatory statutes are the rule, any given state would find some difficulty
in applying burdens on foreign insurance companies considerably. in excess
of those found elsewhere, because its own insurance companies would find
themselves operating under the same extra burdens in all other states in which
they might be doing business. Thus, in any state having insurance companies
which do business in a number of other states, the legislature would quickly
have its attention called to the effect on that state's own companies of any
increase in the burdens it imposed on foreign insurers. In 1959 the Illinois
legislature contemplated raising the tax on foreign insurers from two per cent
to four per cent to raise more revenue. Illinois insurers operating in other states
defeated the measure by showing that for every additional dollar collected by
Illinois, the insurance companies of Illinois doing business in other states would
pay an additional ten dollars under the retaliatory laws of other states.' Even
more recently, due to retaliation by other states, Texas was forced to amend
the part of its Insurance Code relating to permissible investments by insurance
companies."
Thus, retaliatory statutes not only protect domestic insurers when they do
business in another state, but also indirectly protect foreign insurers from any
increase in burdens. If the statutes worked completely, the result would be an
equal level of burdens imposed in each state on foreign insurers, probably resulting in a uniform rate of taxation, as this is the largest single exaction or burden.
Indeed, the statutes may be the reason why the tax on premiums -has. stayed
close to two per cent in most states.
11 E.g., Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Knowlton, 94 N.H. 409, 54 Atl.2d 163
(1947); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 161 Wash. 135, 296 Pac. 813 (1931); Life & Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 25 S.W.2d 748, 749 (1930) ("The primary purpose of. this
act is not to raise revenue but to secure for the insurance companies of Kentucky even-handed
treatment by the legislatures of other states."). Contra, Patterson, op. cit. supra note 10.
12 This example is cited in Felton, Retaliatory Insurance Taxation, October 1961 BEST'S
FIRE& CAS. NEws 81, 88 (1961).
13 Ch. 151 S.B. No. 236 (1963); Ch. 389, H.B. No. 686 (1963) amended TEx. INS. CODE
ANN. § 3.39 (1963). The Dallas Morning News, Aug. 18, 1963, p. 15, col. 4 stated that the
Texas law had to be changed as the "retaliatory tax laws impede expansion of Texas insurance
companies into other states." However, the changes appear to be slight as most of the former
law is retained. Texas also has an unusual taxing scheme whereby reductions in the premium
tax rate are given for certain percentages of assets invested in Texas securities. TEx. Rav.
Civ. STAT. art. 7064 (1960). The California Attorney General has held that this discriminates
in favor of Texas insurers and deserves retaliation under the California retaliatory statute. 39
CAL. ATT'y. GEN. Ops. 98 (1962).
Texas may in time also find it necessary to repeal this law
if other states follow the California determination. See also Employers Cas. Co. v. Hobbs, 52
Kan. 815, 107 P.2d 715 (1940); (1960-1962) ORE. ATT'y. GEN. BIENNIAL RaP. 80 (concerns
a similar statute of Alabama).
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II. CONsTrruTIoNALrrY
In 1868 in Paul v. Virginia 4 the United States Supreme Court upheld
a discretionary license requirement of Virginia applicable only to foreign
insurers. The Court said that because corporations were merely a creature of
the law of the state of their incorporation and dependent on the comity of
other states for recognition, they were not citizens within the privileges and
immunities clause of the Constitution. Thus, the states could:
exclude the foreign corporation entirely, . . . restrict its business to
particular localities, or . .. exact such security for the performance
of its contracts with their citizens as in their judgment will best
promote the public interest. The whole matter rests in their discretion.' 5
The Court went on to hold that insurance was not commerce within the meaning of the commerce clause:
The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss by
fire, entered into between the corporations and the insured, for a
consideration paid by the latter. These contracts are not articles
of commerce in any proper meaning of the word. . . . They are
like other personal contracts between parties which are completed
by their signature and the transfer of the consideration. Such
contracts are not interstate transactions, though the parties may be
domiciled in different States. The policies do not take effectare not executed contracts - until delivered by the agent in
Virginia. They are, then, local transactions, and are governed
by the local law.' 6
The Court's determination that "issuing a policy of insurance was not a
transaction of commerce" was expanded by subsequent cases to include all
8 the Court permitted
aspects of the insurance business.' In Ducat v. Chicago"
a discretionary tax on foreign insurers by holding that the law was clearly
established that a state could discriminate against foreign insurance companies.
This was followed by Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York' 9 in which
the Court specifically upheld the constitutionality of the New York retaliatory
statute. Philadelphia Fire Association, a Pennsylvania insurer doing business
in New York, objected to the imposition of a three per cent premium tax
under the retaliatory statute, (three per cent being the rate charged New
York insurers doing business in Pennsylvania). Philadelphia's sole argument
was that the tax was unlawful because the Association was a "person" within
the "jurisdiction" of New York, and it had been denied "equal protection
of the laws" under the fourteenth amendment. The Court, relying on Paul v.
Virginia, stated that: "The State, having the power to exclude entirely, has
the power to change the conditions of admission at any time, for the future,
and to impose as a condition the payment of a new tax, or a further tax, as
a license fee."20 Further, a foreign corporation was not within the "jurisdic14
15
16
17

18
19
20

75 U.S. (8 Wail.) 168 (1868).
Id. at 181.
Id. at 183.
See Powell, Insurance as Commerce, 57 HARV. L. REv. 936, 942-56 (1944).

77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 410 (1870).
119 U.S. 110 (1886).
Id. at 119.
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tion" of New York until it paid its taxes, including the retaliatory tax which
was the object of the suit, and thereby obtained its license to do business. 21
It is noteworthy that the majority opinion specifically left open the commerce
question, which had not been argued.22
Seventy-six years after Paul v. Virginia, the Court overruled the concept
of insurance as purely local and permitted federal antitrust prosecution in
the South-Eastern Underwriters case.2" The implications of the decision for
state regulation, especially that which discriminated against foreign insurers,
were profound. If insurance were no longer local but instead were "commerce"
between the states, it fell within the constitutional guarantee of freedom from
discrimination against interstate commerce. The response of the states was
significant. Fourteen immediately repealed their retaliatory laws, and nineteen took steps to equalize tax rates between foreign and domestic insurers.2 "
Another important result of South-Eastern Underwriters was the amenability of insurance to congressional regulation in matters other than antitrust.
Here, however, Congress proceeded on a rather unusual tack. Congress may
"regulate" interstate commerce "through the device of divestment of a subject
matter of its interstate character, thus indirectly causing state laws to apply." 5

21 The law is still much the same. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S.
408 (1946); Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 445, n. 6 (1946); Metropolitan Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Brownell, 68 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1934), aff'd, 294 U.S. 580 (1935). Once the corporation is admitted to do business in the state it becomes a "person" entitled to the guarantees of
the "equal protection clause." However, classifications for taxation, including a domestic-out-ofstate dichotomy, are not violations of the clause if there is reasonable ground for it. Prudential
Ins. Co., supra;Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., supra. The insurance retaliatory statutes are a legitimate classification. See infra note 34. See also 17 FLETCHER, CLYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS §§
8396, 8399 (perm. ed. rev. 1960); 40 MINN. L. Rav. 508 (1956).
Arguments based on the "due process clause" have received similar treatment. Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (An Act of Congress permitting state tax legislation which discriminates against interstate commerce is not for that reason a violation of the
"due process clause.") See FLETCHER, Op. cit. supra at § 8395. See infra note 33.
22
It is not to be implied, from anything we have said, that the power of a
State to exclude a foreign corporation from doing business within its limit
is to be regarded as extending to an interference with the transaction of commerce between that State and other States by a corporation created by one
of such other States.
Philadelphia Fire Ass'n v. New York, 119 U.S. 110, 120 (1886).
23 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). There were
two dissenting opinions. Chief Justice Stone in his, concurred in by Justice Frankfurter, stated
(at 574) that nothing in the legislative history of the Sherman Antitrust Act suggested that
it was to be applied to the business of insurance. He sternly warned (at 583) of the consequences
of overturning the precedents of seventy-five years which governed "a business of such volume
and of such wide ramifications." Furthermore, the decision "cannot fail to be the occasion for
loosing a flood of litigation and of legislation, state and national, in order to establish a new
boundary between state and national power. . . ." While the decision did removela legal
anachronism from the books (see infra note 26) it imperiled the existing order, and in this
respect Chief Justice Stone was correct. Fortunately this did not have to be proved for Congress intervened. For an excellent analysis of South-Eastern Underwriters see Stern, The
Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, Part Two, 59 HARV. L. Rav. 883,
909-25 (1946).
24 Kastner Talks on Premium Tax Situation, 45 EASTERN UNDERWRITER 4 (Nov. 9, 1945).
Many of the states in attempting to further mollify the situation equalized premium tax rates
between domestic and out-of-state companies.
25 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 168 (Corwin ed. 1952).
Chief Justice Stone in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945) said:
"It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may authorize
the states, in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens on it."
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The McCarran-Ferguson Act26 in 1945 did just this by returning the regulation of the insurance industry to the states, provided each would enact adequate
laws in certain areas."
Thus in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin," the Court was able to allow
South Carolina to discriminate in the application of a premium tax between
domestic and foreign insurance companies because this was permitted by the
McCarran Act.29 The Court held that the commerce clause was not a limitation upon Congress but a grant of power which Congress had exercised by
enacting the McCarran Act. The congressional power over the commerce
did not prohibit discrimination against interstate commerce. Thus if the states
and Congress exercise the power jointly, their action, like that of Congress alone,
was largely unlimited. State action could be overturned only if the evil in
contravention of the Constitution was clear and gross.
Shortly thereafter, the Court in a per curium decision"0 citing Prudential,
affirmed a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, In re Insurance Tax Cases,"'
59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958).
The former belief that insurance was not commerce, and thus not subject to Congressional
regulation, had "rested on a sustained tradition of local control and on oft-repeated words by
the Supreme Court." But with the expansion of the commerce power from its first outlines in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), plus the growth of the fiscal powers of the
nation as expounded by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
315 (1819), it was as clear as "anything could be - short of a judicial decision - that Congress had ample authority to take over full control of insurance any time it so desired." Dowling,
Congress & Insurance, 5 J. PuB. L. 110 (1956) (emphasis added). See Stem, supra note 23
at 909.
27 For an analysis of its subsequent effectiveness by one of its authors, see McCarran, Insurance as Commerce, 23 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 299 (1948); see also Ekem, The Regulation
of Insurance, 1951 INs. L. J. 409.
28 328 U.S. 408 (1946). Accord, State v. Prudential Ins. Co., 224 Ind. 17, 64 N.E.2d 150
(1945), aff'd per curiam 328 U.S. 823 (1946); In re Insurance Tax Cases, 160 Kan. 300, 161
P.2d 726 (1945), aff'd per curiam, American Indemnity Co. v. Hobbs, 328 U.S. 822 (1946);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 200 Miss. 233, 27 So. 2d 60 (1946).
29 The fact that the Act has engendered such discrimination has not passed without
criticism. In an article in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review entitled "The Insurance
Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of Regulated Competition," the authors in speaking of Prudentialand the McCarran Act say:
In the years since this decision was handed down, many if not all of the
states have levied premium taxes on out-of-state companies. The burdensome nature of these taxes is increased by the fact that they are not uniform
as to rate or rate base....
This ability of the McCarran Act to insulate such legislation from attack
on constitutional grounds must be counted against it in our attempt to assess
its over-all impact. There can be no economic justification for such a tax.
States desiring to protect their citizens from "foreign" companies domiciled
in states where regulation is less stringent can surely find more effective tools
than what is, in effect, a discriminatory protective tariff.
Dirlam & Stelzer, The Insurance Industry: A Case Study in the Workability of Regulated
Compethtion, 107 U. PA. L. Rv. 199, 204 (1958). It is noteworthy that retaliatory statutes
are expressly designed to eliminate this discrimination insofar as a state cannot impose too
great a burden on foreign insurers doing business in the state because of possible retaliation on
domestic insurers doing business in other states. However, if a state imposes a burden on domestic insurers well below usual impositions in the other states, it will be able to discriminate
against foreign insurers up to the usual imposition without fear of significant retaliation. Also,
a state having few local insurers will have little compunction against a high burden on out-ofstate companies. Other than these two instances retaliatory statutes are effective agents in
seeking to reduce discrimination against out-of-state insurers.
30 American Indemnity Co. v. Hobbs, 328 U.S. 822 (1946). See also [1945-1946] N. M.
ATT'Y GEN. REP. 72, upholding constitutionality of New Mexico retaliatory law right after
South-Eastern decision and enactment of McCarran Act.
31 160 Kan. 300, 161 P.2d 726 (1945).
26
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upholding the validity of taxes and fees imposed on foreign insurers under the
Kansas law which included a retaliatory provision.
The constitutionality of retaliatory statutes has been further upheld in
state courts against arguments that the laws violated a state constitutional
provision of equality and uniformity in taxation, 2 that they were a denial of
due process, 3 that they were a violation of equal protection, 4 and that they
represented an unconstitutional delegation of the taxing power to the legislature of the other state. 3 Alabama is the only state now holding that a retaliatory statute is unconstitutional. 6 The Alabama court viewed the statute as a
grant of the "law-making power" to the other state and a denial of equal
protection.
III.

THE STATUTES IN OPERATION:

APPLICATION, EFFECT

AND CONSTRUCTION

A. General Rules
The basic purpose of retaliatory statutes is the equalization of burdens
imposed on foreign insurance companies by increasing the burdens in the
retaliating state to meet those of the state in which they are greater. The
statutes seek to achieve this purpose on the basis of reciprocity, or comity;

but, when reciprocity is denied, a retaliating sanction results. Hence, the courts
have held that the statutes should be "strictly construed, executed with care,
applied to any case that does not fall plainly within the letter of the
and not
'
law.

32 Held a licensing measure: Commonwealth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 87
A.2d 255, 258 (1952) ("The rule is well established that uniformity requires only that a basis
of classification be reasonable."); Clay v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 168 Ky. 315, 181 S.W. 1123
(1916); Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Durfee, 164 III. 186, 45 N.E. 441 (1896).
33 Held a legitimate exercise of the police power: New York Life Ins. Co. v. State, 192
Wis. 404, 211 N.W. 288 (1926).
34 Held a state has a right to impose conditions of admission or that it is a legitimate
classification: State ex rel. Baldwin v. Insurance Co. of North America, 115 Ind. 257, 17 N.E.
574, 579 (1888) ("The legislature may classify for the purposes of taxation or license, and
When the classification is in its nature not arbitrary, but just and fair, there can be no constitutional objection. . ."); People v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 92 N.Y. 311, 326 (1883), aff'd,
the condition imposed is not a violation of the Federal Constitu119 U.S. 110 (1886) ("....
tion . . . fourteenth article, for that relates wholly to persons within the jurisdiction, already
there in fact and of right, and their treatment thereafter, and not at all to the terms and conditions on which ... they can come in.") See supra note 21.
35 Held to merely be contingent on external circumstances: Clay v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co.,
168 Ky. 315, 181 S.W. 1123 (1916); Texas Co. v. Dickinson, 79 N.J.L. 292, 75 At. 803
(1910); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Insurance Co. of North America, 115 Ind. 257, 17 N.E. 574
(1888); People v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 92 N.Y. 311 (1883), aff'd, 119 U.S. 110 (1886);
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 480 (1883); Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653
(1882); Goldsmith v. Home Ins. Co., 62 Ga. 379 (1878); Haverhill Ins. Co. v. Prescott, 42
N.H. 547 (1861).
36 State v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 223 Ala. 134, 134 So. 858 (1931), 45 H'Av. L. Rv.
184 (1931), 16 MrNN. L. Rav. 433 (1932); Clark & Murrell v. Port of Mobile, 67 Ala. 217
(1880), commented on in 10 INs. L. J. 361 (1880). The statute was later re-enacted and an
opinion of the State Attorney General based on the Firemen'sFund case declares it to be unconstitutional. [Oct.-Dec. 1943] 23 ALA. ATT'Y GEN. QUARTERLY REP. 18. Kentucky originally held
its retaliatory statute unconstitutional as a delegation of power to the other states in Western
& Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 Ky. 292, 117 S.W. 376 (1909), but this was
overruled in Clay v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 168 Ky. 315, 181 S.W. 1123 (1916).
1 37 Bankers' Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113, 218 Pac. 586, 591 (1923) (emphasis
added); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State, 161 Wash. 135, 296 Pac. 813 (1931); Life &
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Retaliatory statutes will not be invoked unless the restrictions or burdens
of the foreign state can be clearly proved."8 It must be shown as a matter of
fact that the foreign state imposes greater burdens or prohibitions upon insurance companies of the retaliating state than are presently levied by that state
on like companies of the foreign state doing business in it. If the statutes of
the foreign state are not clear, there must either have been judicial construotion by the courts of the foreign state or administrative application of the
ambiguous legislation. The administrative action does not have to be correct
or even within the apparent power of the agency; all that is required is the
actual imposition of the restrictions or burdens.
A Virginia case 9 was concerned with action of the Rhode Island insurance
commissioner, who under dubious legislative authority had required a ninety
thousand dollar additional security deposit from a Virginia insurance company
because of its financial difficulties. Under its statute, Virginia had retaliated
by requiring the same additional security deposits from Rhode Island insurance
companies doing business in Virginia. The Rhode Island insurance company
in question urged that the Rhode Island commissioner did not have the power
to act as he did. The Virginia court held that he did, but said that the crucial
issue was the fact of Rhode Island's actions, not the propriety of the action
under Rhode Island law.
The Rhode Island insurance company in the above case further argued
that it was not a "like" insurance company under the statute because its capital
structure varied from that of the Virginia insurer Rhode Island had acted on.
The court held that "like" meant companies handling similar lines of insurance
a decision in line with that of most courts.'
There does not have to be an insurance company from the retaliating state
already doing business in the other state for there to be a "like" company for
purposes of invoking the retaliatory statute. Although some contrary authority
exists,"' the majority view is that the mere possibility of a future entry into
the other state by a company from the retaliating state is sufficient cause for
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 25 S.W.2d 748, 749 (1930) ("All courts hold
that retaliatory tax laws are penal in nature and should be strictly construed") ; Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Boys, 296 Ill. 166, 129 N.E. 724 (1920); State ex rel. Crittenberger v. Continental Ins. Co., 67 Ind. App. 536, 116 N.E. 929 (1917); State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Fidelity
& Casualty Ins. Co., 49 Ohio St. 440, 31 N.E. 658 (1892). But see Employers Casualty Co. v.
Hobbs, 152 Kan. 815, 107 P.2d 715, 716 (1940) ("The real purpose of these statutes is not
retaliation but substantial equality and comity between states and countries") ; Phoenix Ins. Co.
v. Welch, 29 Kan. 480 (1883).
38 Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Corp. Commission,
195 Va. 752, 80 S.E.2d 549 (1954); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 25
S.W.2d 748 (1930); Bankers' Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113, 218 Pac. 586 (1923);
State v. American Ins. Co., 79 Ind. App. 88, 137 N.E. 338 (1922); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Boys, 296 Ill. 166, 129 N.E. 724 (1920); State v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 39 Minn.
538, 41 N.W. 108 (1888); State ex rel. New England Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Reinmund, 45
Ohio St. 214, 13 N.E. 30 (1887).
39 Equitable Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth ex rel. State Corp. Commission,
195 Va. 752, 80 S.E.2d 549 (1954).
40 This factor seems inherent in the judicial decisions; however, see Fidelity & Deposit Co.
v. Brown, 92 Vt. 390, 104 Atl. 234 (1918), where application of the retaliatory statute was
refused on this basis. Some statutes (for example, Delaware and Michigan) specifically require
that there be a "like" or "similar" company.
41 Clay v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 169 Ky. 337, 183 S.W. 529 (1916); State ex rel. Att'y
Gen. v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 49 Ohio St. 440, 31 N.E. 658 (1892). The Ohio decision
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applying the retaliatory law.42 In an early Illinois case, Germania Ins. Co. v.
Swigert," the court faced a retaliatory statute which required the laws of the
other state actually to be imposed on agencies of Illinois companies. It said:
Does a law any the less require a thing to be done because there
is no present subject-matter upon which to operate? The requirement of the law is but the declaration of the rule to be observed,
and it must antecede the facts which call it into action. The
existence of the law and the existence of a present subject-matter
upon which it will take effect are entirely distinct things.... [The
existing law makes the requirement- declares the rule - and it
remains in force just as well without as with a present subjectmatter upon which to actively operate; and since it is the existence
of the law, and not the application of the law to its subjectmatter, that determines when [the retaliatory statute] shall be
obligatory, it must follow that it is unimportant whether insurance
companies organized under the laws of this state, have agencies
in the state of Louisiana or not.44
Furthermore, said the court, there was no provision made in the statute ascertaining whether Illinois companies were operating in the other state.
In 1943 Massachusetts enacted a new tax statute which continued the
old tax rate for insurance companies already established and doing business,
but provided lower rates for new companies. This posed a real problem for
states having retaliatory laws but having no insurance companies operating
in Massachusetts. Should the retaliatory statute be applied on the same basis
as in cases such as Germania even though there were not, and never could
be, any insurance companies of that state subject to the old high tax? In the
three states in which the point was litigated, including Illinois, it was held
that the retaliatory statute could not be applied.4 The Illinois court distinguished
Germania on the ground that the Massachusetts statute contained intrinsic
limitations as to its applicability and duration. The statute depended by its
very terms on the existence of an Illinois company which could fall under this
extra tax limitation and there were none.
Some retaliatory statutes expressly provide for retaliation not only if
there are insurers of the retaliating state doing business in the other state, but
was recently relied on by the Attorney General of Ohio in an opinion. Ohio Att'y Gen. Informal Opinion No. 544, December 28, 1962, pp. 13-16. See also [1955-1956] FLA. ATT'Y GEN.
BIENNIAL REP. 363, where the statutory requirement of an actual company doing business in
the other state was followed literally.
42 State v. Insurance Co. of North America, 71 Neb. 335, 100 N.W. 405 (1904); State
v. Insurance Co. of North America, 71 Neb. 335, 100 N.W. 405 (1904); Union Central Life
Ins. Co. v. Durfee, 164 Ill. 186, 45 N.E. 441 (1896); State ex rel. Phillips v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 77 Iowa 648, 42 N.W. 509 (1889); Germania Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 128 Ill. 237, 21
N.E. 530 (1889); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672 (1883). See Appleman, op. cit.
supra note 4 at pg. 60; 17 Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 4, at pg. 539:
To justify the imposition of a retaliatory statute by a state it is not
necessary that there be a domestic company of that state doing business in the
state against which the retaliation is made, and the mere existence of a discriminatory law in another state may be sufficient to put such retaliatory
statute into operation.
43 128 Ill. 237, 21 N.E. 530 (1889).
44 Id. at 532.
45 Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Parkinson, 414 Ill. 120, 110 N.E.2d 256 (1953);
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Knowlton, 94 N.H. 409, 54 A.2d 163 (1947); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 163 Kan. 289, 181 P.2d 512 (1947).
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also if there are companies in the retaliating state which "might seek to do
business in such other state." 46 However, the Texas statute, along with those
of most other states, requires that there be a direct imposition upon a domestic
insurance company before there can be retaliation. This requirement for a
company actually to be doing business in the other state can be explained
away, as in Germania, or it could be argued that the onerous requirements of
the other state are the reason for the absence from that state of any of their
insurance companies.
B. Equalizing the Burden: Determination, Comparison.
The determination of the propriety of retaliation against a foreign insurance company is dependent upon the exactions from insurance companies of
the retaliating state doing business in the state of domicile of the foreign company. The question is thus whether these "exactions" are greater than those
required by the retaliating state. The statutes of the other state must be
examined to see if this be the case, which due to the variance in insurance
statutes cannot always be an exact comparison. Nor is it a simple task.
If each state were to impose the same taxes on insurance companies with
variance only as to rates, and other burdens were equal, the problems in applying retaliatory statutes would be greatly simplified. The insurance commissioner
of the retaliating state could then easily compare the burden by a comparison
of the rates. However, each state has different regulations and systems of
taxation of insurance companies which vary not only as to rates, but also
as to rate application. One state may impose a general tax on insurance companies on the basis of gross premiums, whereas another may tax on the basis
of gross premiums less claims paid. Also, one state may impose taxes or fees,
allow deductions or exclusions, or provide for deferred installment payments
of its tax, all of which may not be available in another state.
Because they are the greatest burdens, the bases of retaliation are primarily
(1) the tax on premium income earned in the state and (2) the fees paid.
In applying their retaliatory statute some state insurance commissLons consider these items alone because of the difficulty involved in computing and
comparing all the burdens, due no doubt to the lack of uniformity on insurance regulation among the states. Moreover, the commissions are generally
understaffed and to make adequate comparison would take considerably more
manpower with little possibility of an increase in revenue.
1. Aggregate Versus Item-by-Item Approach
When making a comparison between the exactions of one state and those
of the state in which the foreign insurance company is chartered, what is
intended is not a comparison of a particular tax with a like tax, a particular
fee with similar fee, nor a balancing of fines, penalties or other obligations
with those of the other state. The immediate difficulty with that method of
comparison arises where the other state imposes an obligation which the
retaliating state does not have, as then there could be no valid comparison.
46

E.g., Arizona, Delaware and Maryland.
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Rather, what is intended is an aggregate comparison, at least of those burdens
which can be aggregated.
In Employers Cas. Co. v. Hobbs,"7 a Kansas case involving a Texas
insurance company doing business in Kansas, the company claimed that' it
was wrongly forced to pay certain sums which a Kansas insurance company'
would have had to pay in Texas, but which were not prescribed by the Kansas
taxing statute. These were: 1) six dollars for publication of certificates of
compliance by all insurance companies doing business in Texas, 2) one hundred-fifty-five dollars as one-fifth of one per cent of premiums received by the
company for motor vehicle insurance, and 3) five-hundred dollars as threefifths of one per cent of the premiums received by the plaintiff on all workmen's compensation insurance in Kansas. The Texas insurer first sought to
argue that items of taxation should be matched on an item-by-item basis and
if Texas had a tax not used in Kansas there could be no exaction under the
Kansas statute. Under this theory, Kansas could retaliate only on items specified in both Texas and Kansas and as to which the burden imposed by Texas
was greater than that imposed by Kansas. In the alternative the company urged
an aggregate approach. The court accepted the latter argument, saying that the
statute required payment for the privilege of doing business in Kansas of "an
amount equal to the amount of such charges and payments imposed by the laws
of such other state," when they were greater.
The Employers case follows the general method of using a comparison
of the aggregate of the burdens imposed.4" What is sought is a comparison
of the cost of doing business between the states concerned, even though with
certain burdens this is not possible.
There is a logical division between items such as taxes, licenses or fees,
and fines, penalties, security deposits, or prohibitions. "Other obligations" or
"other charges" when used in a statute, could conceivably, depending on the
nature of the items involved, be grouped within any of the categories above.
Using the aggregate approach for taxes, licenses and fees is logical, as these
are "recurrent annual governmental charges for doing business." But fines,
penalties, deposit requirements and prohibitions are generally non-recurring
items, making it more difficult to assess their burden as part of an aggregate.
The proper application of the retaliatory statute to these items is on an itemby-item approach. That is, when a fine or penalty is invoked against a foreign
insurance company, and in the foreign state a higher fine or penalty is imposed
for a similar infraction, this higher amount should be imposed. As to security
deposits and prohibitions, if the foreign state has greater deposit requirements
or prohibitions, then they would be imposed against the foreign state's insurers,
again, an item-by-item approach. Another approach to this problem would
be for the commissioner merely to take these items into consideration, but
47 149 Kan. 774, 89 P.2d 923 (1939).
48 Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Stowell, 172 Ohio St. 167, 174 N.E.2d 536
(1961); Employers Casualty Co. v. Hobbs, 149 Kan. 774, 89 P.2d 923 (1939) ; Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 107 Mont. 48, 80 P.2d 383 (1938); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Pink, 276 N.Y. 421, 12 N.E.2d 529 (1938); Bankers' Life Co. v. Richardson, 192 Cal. 113,
218 Pac. 586 (1923). Contra, Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 325 Mass. 386, 90
N.E.2d 668 (1950); [1941-1942] MINN. ATr'Y GEN. Ops., 145.
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not in a purely mathematical formula, in determining whether the retaliatory
statute should be applied to the circumstances before him. This may, in fact,
be a necessary prerequisite to the use of any specific comparisons, for if on
balance the total burdens, including an abstract comparison in toto of fines,
penalties and other obligations and prohibitions of the other state is not
greater, the retaliatory statute is not applicable at all.
Ultimately, this resolves itself into the question of how far the insurance
commissioner wishes to go in applying the retaliatory statute, for the ease of
retaliating only on premium taxes and fees may overcome other advantages
gained by a more complete retaliation. Provided the other burdens imposed
in the other state are not substantially more than those in the retaliating state
there will be no litigation over the lack of full retaliation. Also, in such a case
there is the possibility of mutual retaliation if the computation of burdens imposed in the other state is not correct or complete. That is, the foreign state may
in turn retaliate if, after the home state has applied its retaliatory provisions,
the foreign state computes the resulting burdens imposed on its insurers doing
business in the retaliating state to be in excess of those it imposes on insurers
from that state.
Quite a few statutes, including those of California and Illinois, make
the logical distinction between taxes, licenses or fees and other obligations.
New York separates (1) deposits of securities; (2) taxes, fines, penalties;
(3) fees for licenses and certificates of authority; and (4) restrictions, obligations, conditions or penalties imposed for the privilege of doing business. Also,
many states segregate security deposits by providing that if the other state
has a greater deposit requirement, companies of that state doing business
in the retaliating state "shall make like deposits for like purposes. . . ."" However, most statutes do not make any distinction between the various items but
group them together as, for example, the Texas statute set out above.
As shown by a recent Ohio case, Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Stowell,"0 statutory
authority for this separation is not necessary. The question raised in that case
was whether the retaliatory statute should be invoked against a Pennsylvania
insurance company for license fees imposed on a similar Ohio company in
Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania fees were greater than those imposed by
Ohio, but the aggregate burden of taxes and license fees on an Ohio company
in Pennsylvania would be no greater than on a Pennsylvania company in
Ohio. As a result of a prior case, the Ohio Superintendent of Insurance recognized that he was required to consider taxes in the aggregate in applying the
statute. But, he urged that because the statute uses the words "taxes, fines,
penalties, license fees, deposits of money, securities, or other obligations or
49 This is the wording of the New York statute. See also, e.g., the statutes of Colorado,
Illinois, Kansas and Michigan. While most states do mention security deposits in their statute,
not all segregate this requirement and specify a "like" imposition as the states above do. Under
statutes which do not so specify, it would not be mandatory on the Insurance Commissioner to
impose "like" deposits, and he could merely consider this as a factor in deciding whether any
retaliation is appropriate. However, most states do retaliate on a "like" basis for such items,
regardless of whether their statute requires it.
50 172 Ohio St. 167, 174 N.E.2d 536 (1961). Cf. [1960-1962] ORa. ATT'y G.N. BIENNIAL
REP. 449.
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prohibitions" and it would be impossible to aggregate all these items, he should
not be required to aggregate any two or more of them. The Court said that
the general intent of the retaliatory statute was to achieve substantial equality
and this required that taxes and license fees be aggregated. Aggregation in
toto of all burdens was not being urged, and it was sufficient, the Court observed,
to note that there were four logical classifications of the items: (1) taxes and
license fees, (2) fines and penalties, (3) deposits of money or securities and,
(4) prohibitions.
The retaliatory statutes of twenty-three states specifically require that
the aggregate method of computation be used. 5 The Texas and Iowa statutes,
typical of these provisions, provide that when taxes, fees, or other obligations
are imposed upon insurers of that state doing business in another state which
"in the aggregate are in excess of the aggregate" of taxes, fees, or other obligations imposed on similar insurance companies of that other state in the retaliating state, the higher taxes, fees, and other obligations shall be imposed.
The decisions show that statutory authority for the use of the aggregate
approach is not necessary. 2 The statutes of those states which do not have
the word "aggregate" usually have wording to this effect: In case of retaliation
the same taxes, fees, etc., shall "be imposed upon all insurance companies of
such states and their agents,"5 8 or, there shall be imposed "an amount equal
to the amount of such charges and payments imposed by the laws of such other
state or country,"" or, as in New York, "an amount determined in the manner
prescribed by such other state, and shall be subjected to such greater requirements imposed by such other state upon similar insurers of this state. .. ."
The courts have held that even statutes such as the latter do not prevent the
use of the aggregate method.5" In statutes which use the word "amount" it
is noteworthy that the word is used in the singular, whereas if an item-byitem comparison has been intended, "amounts" would have been used.
2. Computation and Comparison of Burdens
In computing the aggregate, problems arise when one state allows a
deduction or grants a benefit which the other does not. In most states the
tax levied on insurance companies is primarily one on premiums collected
in that state, but "premiums" may be net in one state, gross in another.
Similarly, one state may not tax annuities or assessment income, while the
other does. Or, dividends or amounts paid for reinsurance may be deducted
in one, but not another. As a further factor, the usual case is that the state
taxing the lesser level of premium income has the higher rate of taxation.
Take the case of two insurance companies, A and B, A coming from
state X where assessments are not included in "premiums" while B comes
51 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, Washington and West Virginia.
52 E.g., Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Stowell, 172 Ohio St. 167, 174 N.E.2d 536
(1961) ; Employers Casualty Co. v. Hobbs, 149 Kan. 774, 89 P.2d 923 (1939).
53 Indiana.
54 Kansas and Tennessee.
55 Employers Casualty Co. v. Hobbs, 149 Kan. 774, 89 P.2d 923 (1939).
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from state Y where they are included. Other burdens being equal, when is
the retaliatory statute applicable? When A company does business in Y it is
logical there would be no retaliation, provided the rate of taxation is the same.
The tax imposed in Y is greater than in X, where A comes from, for in Y
it is levied on premiums, including assessments. However, if state X has a
higher tax rate it could be argued that state Y should retaliate by taxing premiums, minus assessments, at state X's higher rate and then tax assessment
income at the normal rate which it (state Y) imposes. The argument behind
this is that when B insurance company, as a domiciliary of Y, does business
in X it is taxed at this higher rate on its premiums, less assessments, plus the
fact that the absence of taxation on an item by one state should not preclude
another from taxing it. But this fails to take into account that the total or
aggregate tax payable in state X, which has the higher base rate, may be
less than that payable in state Y where premiums are taxed in full but at a
lesser rate. The Y state courts have generally agreed that the retaliatory statute
is not applicable in such a case. 6 However to the extent necessary to equalize,
total or aggregate tax payable, if the tax payable in X should ever exceed
that payable in Y, Y would then apply its statute.
Another particularly troublesome question is whether the impositions of
local governments are taxes, fees, fines or other obligations includable in the
computation of the aggregate burden imposed by that state. In a 1961 Illinois
case (involving a California insurance company), Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Gerber,5" the court was faced with the problem of whether to take into consideration, in comparing burdens, the Illinois personal property taxes paid
by Pacific. California levied a tax on premiums of two and thirty-five-onehundredths per cent, which was "in lieu of all other taxes and licenses, state,
county and municipal, upon such insurers and their property," except their
real estate. The applicable Illinois rate was two per cent, but the taxing
statutes specifically provided for the exclusion of personal property taxes.
Pacific made two contentions to support its claim for a refund. First, express
language of the retaliatory statute required that the retaliatory tax assessed
against it be reduced by the amount of Illinois personal property taxes paid.
Second, the object of the retaliatory statute was comity as it was a reciprocal
measure with a purpose of equalizing the aggregate burden of all taxes imposed
upon both domestic and foreign insurance companies. The court denied these
contentions, stating:
When the entire section is read, particularly in light of the prefatory language, we think it clear that the legislature included
within its scope only the taxes paid by insurance companies, as
such, as a condition precedent to their doing business in the
respective State. If it were not otherwise, and if plaintiff's theory
was carried to its logical conclusions, the result would be a construction that State differences in such things as motor vehicle fees,
fuel tax and the like, required "by other law(s) of this State,"
56 See State v. American Ins. Co., 79 Ind. App. 88, 137 N.E. 338 (1922); State v. Continental Ins. Co., 67 Ind. App. 536, 116 N.E. 929 (1917); State ex rel. New England Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 45 Ohio St. 214, 13 N.E. 30 (1887).
57 22 Ill.2d 196, 174 N.E.2d 862 (1961).
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were intended to be included in the computation of the retaliatory
tax.... The ad valorem tax on personal property is not assessed
as a condition precedent to the doing of an insurance business

in either California or Illinois.es

In accord with Gerber is a Massachusetts decision,59 which refused to
allow a California insurance company to include payments to a fire preventive
association, the Boston Protective Department, within its computation of taxes
paid in Massachusetts. Because the tax was a payment required by the city,
the court held it was not an exaction imposed by law (that is, a law of the
state), and hence not within the retaliatory statute.6" Similarly a Pennsylvania
court held that payments to the Philadelphia Fire Insurance Patrol were not
"obligations" as used in the Pennsylvania retaliatory statute and could not
be credited against the retaliatory tax assessed. 6 "Obligations" was limited
by the principle of ejustem generis to "obligations" similar to the "taxes, fees,
fines . . ." comprehended by the statute.
However, the majority view is that local burdens should not be retaliated

if the other state allows them to be included in the computation of taxes paid
in that state. The leading case is Life & Gas. Ins. Co. v. Coleman,' in which
the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that municipal taxes paid in that state
by a Tennessee insurance company would be deducted in computing the
amount of taxes owed under the Kentucky retaliatory statute. The primary
taxation of foreign insurance companies in Kentucky was at a rate of two
per cent on the premiums received in the state, while the Tennessee rate was
two and one-half per cent, but it was in lieu of all other taxes. The company
admitted that it was subject under the retaliatory statute to pay two and
one-half per cent, but argued that for purposes of equalization of rates it
should be given a credit (or permitted to deduct) the amount of municipal
taxes paid in Kentucky. The court agreed, but limited the amount of credit
or deduction by providing that the insurance company was always to be
liable for at least two per cent of premiums collected in the state, the normal
Kentucky rate. The court reasoned: The purpose of the statute is equalization of the burdens but there can be no equalization unless the taxes levied
or the obligations imposed are the same in aggregate. For equalization to be
achieved:
[I]t is necessary to levy a specific tax to meet a similar tax levied
by another state, but, if the aggregate of the taxes collected from
a foreign insurance company in the retaliating state equals the tax
imposed on foreign insurance companies by the state in which
the taxed company is incorporated, the object of the law has
been attained. Equality is the result aimed at and is achieved
63
when the ultimate taxes levied are equal ....
58 Id. at 865.
59 Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 325 Mass. 386, 90 N.E.2d 668 (1950).
60 In New York similar deductions are permitted. See infra note 64 and accompanying
text. As a result of the Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. case, however, New York refused to allow
deductions to Massachusetts insurers for payments. 1954 N.Y. Ar'Y GEN. OPS. 189.
61 Commonwealth v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 87 A.2d 255 (1952).
62 233 Ky. 350, 25 S.W.2d 748 (1930).
63 Id. at 750.
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In a New York Court of Appeals decision, John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Pink, ' which involved payments by a Massachusetts insurer of
an excise or general business tax the City of New York imposed on the privilege
of doing business, it was held that the tax was one required or imposed by "the
laws of this state." The Court reasoned that because the state had specifically
authorized the City to levy the tax the City was merely the agent of the state.
It consequently was an imposition within the meaning of the retaliatory statute
and could be deducted from the retaliatory tax due New York. Thus, other
states would not be warranted in retaliating for the business tax so long as
the total burden imposed in their state was higher, making the deduction of
the general business tax from the retaliatory tax a benefit to them.
The Attorney General of Ohio recently rendered an opinion" at the
request of the Insurance Commissioner, wherein he advised against a retaliatory
imposition on New York insurers for the New York City general business tax.
In Pink, supra, the New York tax imposed on foreign insurers was held deductible from any retaliatory tax due. "Therefore, it is evident that (the New
York City general business tax) cannot be considered in determining the
aggregate burden imposed by New York for if the company merely pays this
as a part of its New York tax, it does not become an additional burden which
would compel Ohio to retaliate." 6
The Ohio Attorney General's Opinion also covered payments made under
New York law to local fire departments by out-of-state fire insurance companies,
which amounts were credited against the two per cent premium tax imposed
on these companies. By reason of this credit the Attorney General rejected
any retaliation in Ohio other than in response to the basic two per cent
imposition. This type of credit against the premium tax is to be distinguished
from other instances in which the amount of the item paid was held to be a
credit against the retaliatory tax. In other words, this credit was included
inthe burden imposed in the other state for purposes of comparison of aggregate burdens. The former should never be retaliated against by a like imposition for it is a part of the basic premium tax, whereas the latter, having merely
the status of a credit against the retaliatory tax, can be retaliated against if the
impositions in the other state (namely New York in the above discussion)
are greater, thus precluding a retaliatory tax (due New York) on which it
can be offset.
A Montana decision, Occidental Life Ins. v. Holmes,"7 involved real
estate taxes allowed as a deduction in California but not Montana. Citing the
Kentucky decision in Coleman, supra, the Montana court held that real estate
taxes were a matter properly included in the computation of the respective
burdens. It was shown that if the real estate taxes were added to the Montana
premium tax, which was less than the California rate, the California insurers
in Montana were paying more than Montana insurers in California. Hence,
64
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the retaliatory statute was not applicable. The dissent raised the interesting
proposition that a Montana insurance corporation doing business in California
would not be permitted to deduct any real estate taxes paid in California
from the premium tax because Montana does not permit a California insurer
to deduct real estate taxes. Thus, under the California retaliatory statute,
California would deny such a deduction to a Montana insurer. The obvious
fallacy in this reasoning is that by this case Montana is granting the right to
deduct real estate taxes to California insurers.
If, for example, state X permits the deduction of these essentially local
burdens from the retaliatory tax as a tax, fee, fine, or other obligation imposed
by that state, then state Y should not retaliate these local burdens as was shown
in Occidental, supra, and Coleman, supra. However, this is true only so long
as the total impositions in Y are in excess of those imposed by X on a "like"
company doing the same amount of business. When they are less, then Y should
fully retaliate on the companies from X, including any local impositions. This
line of reasoning is based on the proposition that by the retaliatory laws we
are striving for equalization of burdens; and not simply the imposition of
another tax. Under this reasoning, decisions like that of the Illinois court in
Gerber, are incorrect."
Following Occidental, the Montana legislature amended its retaliatory
statute to accord substantially with the majority decision.
Any tax, license or other fee or other obligation imposed by any city,
county, or other political agency of such other state or country on
Montana insurers of their agents or representatives shall be deemed
to be imposed by such state or country within the meaning of this
section.
This section shall not apply as to personal income taxes, nor as to
ad valorem taxes on real or personal property nor as to special
purpose obligations or assessments imposed by another state in connection with particular kinds of insurance other than property insurance; except that deductions, from premium taxes or other taxes
otherwise payable, allowed on account of real estate or personal
property taxes paid shall be taken into consideration by the Commissioner in determining69the propriety and extent of retaliatory
action under this Section.
The basic provisions in the retaliatory statutes of Arkansas, California,
Florida, Georgia, Oregon, South Dakota and Utah have the above provision.
Under this provision, the retaliating state computing the aggregate burden will
impose the same "local" burdens, with certain exceptions, as are imposed in the
foreign state on the retaliating state's insurers unless the foreign state allows them
as a deduction. In the last instance, the local burdens will be taken into consideration by the commissioner in imposing retaliatory action. Many states,
including Texas, have provisions in their retaliatory statutes that make the statute
inapplicable to ad valorem taxes on real or personal property or to personal income taxes. Some go on further to provide that any tax obligation imposed
68 Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Gerber, 22 Ill.2d 196, 174 N.E.2d 862 (1961); Commonwealth v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 87 A.2d 255 (1952); Firemen's Fund Ins.
Co. v. Commissioner, 325 Mass. 386, 90 N.E.2d 668 (1950).
69 MONT. R-v. CoDEs ANN. § 40-2826 (1947).
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by a city, county or other political subdivision of another state shall be deemed
within the meaning of the retaliatory statute. The addition of this provision,
just as in the Montana provisions above, involves some overlapping, as ad
valorem taxes are also usually imposed by cities and counties. It is arguable,
and this appears to be the interpretation followed, that the non-applicability
of the statute to ad valorem and similar taxes is an exception to the general
rule on local burdens. The rationale for this conclusion is based on the arrangement of the statute; the exception is stated after the general provision making
all local assessments includable in the aggregate.
In a study made in 1958 by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners on "The Problem of Retaliatory Taxation on Municipal Taxes and
Fees" the following reasons were given for why retaliation on these exactions
was difficult:
1. The municipal taxes and fees in a state do not constitute
a simple specific overall tax levy like a state tax at 2 per cent but
can be a multitude of exactions, differing in rate or amount by
community, county, parish or district.
2. Such levies can be upon the company, directly upon the
agent of the company, or upon both.
3. Such levies can be by almost any municipal division of that
state such as city, village, town, county or parish and in one isolated
instance within our knowledge, by a school district.
4. There is question as to the legality of retaliation against
such municipal levies under the normal retaliatory law.
5. There is difficulty of obtaining accurate information for use
as a basis of retaliation.
6. The normal human reluctance of state department personnel
makes them unwilling to undertake difficult added burdens of
administration when most departments are, even now, understaffed.
7. There is apprehension on the part of domestic company
personnel that such retaliation, even if legal, may provoke reprisals
and antagonisms.
Several states are, however, retaliating on the basis of these exactions.
Virginia does so by including in its taxes an additional "charge" which is
computed by applying a stated ratio to the premiums reported as being taxable.
The ratios are calculated each year and are based on the percentage ratio
of taxes paid by Virginia insurers to political subdivisions of the states where
these companies are from compared with premiums received by Virginia companies in these states. Connecticut retaliates against the New York general
business tax in a similar manner. Many retaliatory statutes, including Virginia's, specify retaliation not only for the laws of another state but also for
any political subdivision thereof."0 The statutes of Maryland, Missouri and
70 Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland,
Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia

and West Virginia. See also Michigan. (California and Delaware in letters to this writer state
that they do not retaliate for local burdens at the present.) Even without express authorization
in the statutes there is sufficient broad language to permit this retaliation. (Kansas and New
York in letters to this writer state that they do so retaliate, or have done it on occasion.) See,
e.g., John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Pink, 276 N.Y. 421, 12 N.E.2d 529 (1938); Life &
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 233 Ky. 350, 25 S.W.2d 748 (1930).
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New Jersey specifically provide for computation on a basis similar to that of
Virginia and Connecticut.
What is to be done in the process of equalization if the other state permits
installment payment of the tax? When faced with this question the Illinois
Supreme Court refused to grant an insurance company from a state where
installment payment was permissible (California), either the right to pay in
this manner or a discount."' The Court said that while "comity between the
states is to be encouraged, [and] reciprocity is to be promoted," to allow what
the California insurer urges would be going too far. It would "permit the
California statute to amend or supersede the time fixed for the payment by
the Illinois act."72 A Washington case, Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. State,"
reached a contrary result on the same California provision, the Court saying:
[he Insurance Commissioner should take into consideration, in
connection with other pertinent facts, the time fixed for the payment
of the tax, and if, as in the case at bar, it appears that the tax
paying date is later than that fixed by our statute, that fact should
be considered in deciding whether or not the tax imposed by the
sister state is74in fact more onerous than that imposed by our
insurance act.
In Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Holmes, supra, the Montana court simply assumed
the right of the State tax collector to make a percentage allowance for the
privilege granted in California.
In a Texas case,"5 under a prior retaliatory statute, an Oklahoma insurance company had secured a reduction of its rate of taxation under the Texas
insurance law by investing a certain proportion of its assets in Texas property.
Its new rate of taxation was one and one-half per cent of premiums earned
in Texas. The Oklahoma rate for a similar foreign company would have been
four per cent, which the Insurance Commissioner argued was grounds for
applying the retaliatory statute. The Court said that in reality compliance with
this provision for reduction of rates was equal to paying an aggregate rate
of four and five-one hundredths per cent and hence the retaliatory statute did
not apply. The Texas retaliatory statute was then amended to accord with
this result.
This Texas law, which grants a lower tax rate if the company invests a
certain proportion of its assets in Texas securities also caused problems in determining the burden of a Texas insurance company outside the state. In a
Kansas case a Texas insurance company urged that the computation for
retaliatory purposes should be the same as would be applied to a Kansas
company in Texas if the Kansas company had invested fifty per cent of its
assets in Texas securities."0 The obvious fallacy of such reasoning is that the
analogy is valid only if the Kansas company had invested fifty per cent of its
71
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assets in Texas. This fallacious analogy, a sort of reverse renvoi, was also
attempted in a Wisconsin case in which the insurance company unsuccessfully
sought to obtain a deduction in two states for one inspection fee."'
Another problem arises when a state refuses to allow a certain line or
type of insurance to be sold in that state. In Ohio, for example, workmen's
compensation insurance is said to be impressed with a public interest and
private insurance companies may not write it." An employer in Ohio must
either become a self-insurer or pay premiums to the state fund monopoly. The
Pennsylvania Attorney General stated that this "prohibition" should be applied
against Ohio insurers doing business in Pennsylvania because of the Pennsylvania law requiring retaliation for "prohibitions."7 This problem was subsequently considered by a lower court in Pennsylvania which, in a well-reasoned
opinion,8 ° held that Ohio insurers could write workmen's compensation insurance in Pennsylvania. Ohio's public policy against private insurance companies writing workmen's compensation insurance was not a "prohibition"
as that term was used in the retaliatory statute."" The Court said:
The establishment of such a policy implies no favoritism to Ohio
companies,

and no

"discrimination"

against ours. .

.

. Ohio

companies, as well as Pennsylvania companies are within the
prohibition of the Ohio Statute, and to invoke retaliation because
of the adoption of such public policy would be to give the statute
an extremely liberal, instead of a strict, construction.8
The statute required "like" impositions to be imposed, but, said the Court,
contrary to the Attorney General's Opinion, there could be no "likeness" in
impositions here. Pennsylvania had its own fund for insuring State-owned
property, said the Court, yet Pennsylvania insurers had not been forbidden
from insuring state-owned property in other states. Subsequently the Pennsylvania retaliatory statute was amended to provide that the existence of a
monopolistic state fund for writing a certain type of insurance was not to be
construed as a reason to deny insurers from that state the right to transact
such classes of insurance in Pennsylvania.
In the recent Ohio Attorney General's Opinion discussed earlier, it was
similarly held that because Ohio insurers had the right to write workmen's
compensation insurance in other states, and no insurer had that right in
Ohio, it would be improper for Ohio to retaliate against special burdens imposed in New York on Ohio insurers for the privilege of selling workmen's
compensation insurance.8" As the Pennsylvania Court had said, the unequal
77 Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. State, 265 Wis. 414, 61 N.W.2d 816 (1953).
78 OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.82 (1954) (private insurance companies forbidden to
write workmen's compensation insurance). See also Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U.S. 361, 368
(1920).
79
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80 Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neel, 55 Dauph. 325 (Pa. C.P., Dauphin County 1945).
81 The argument was one of ejusdem generis. "Prohibition" was included with other terms
(taxes, fines, penalties, licenses, fees) which imposed financial obligations on insurance companies and was intended to apply to similar prohibitions, cf. Commonwealth v. Firemen's Fund
Ins. Co., 369 Pa. 560, 87 A.2d 255, (1952) (payments to be a fire patrol not an "obligation"
as used in the retaliatory statute).
82 Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neel, 55 Dauph. 325, 332 (Pa. C.P., Dauphin County
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treatment which the retaliatory statutes aimed at preventing was not present
here. and hence retaliation would be improper."' In other words, the application of the retaliatory statute would not have achieved any equalization of
burdens between domestic companies of both states doing business in the other
state.
The Ohio Attorney General's Opinion also refused to sanction retaliation
on contributions to a fund designed to protect policyholders and claimants
from the insolvency of companies writing automobile liability policies or surety
bonds in conformity with the Financial Security Act. The funds so collected
were in the nature of a "trust," something apart and separate from the public
funds. Ohio had not seen fit to enact such a comprehensive program for the
protection of the public against the problem of the uninsured motorist and to
retaliate against New York insurers for its program would not, just as in the
case of workmen's compensation insurance, gain equality of treatment for Ohio
insurers.
The Pennsylvania case and the Ohio Attorney General's Opinion interpret the retaliatory statute from a broad purpose concept of what is meant
by "taxes, fines, fees, . . . other obligations and prohibitions." This interpretation is quite proper and necessary if, indeed, the statutes are to achieve their
purpose of substantially equalizing burdens.
3. Mutual Retaliation
In computing the representative aggregate burden of the foreign state,
care must be taken that it adequately represents the imposition in the other
state.
[Retaliatory] statutes are proper and, indeed, necessary, but should
be invoked only in cases where the inequitable discrimination is
clearly established; otherwise the Insurance Commissioner of the
state against which the law is brought into operation will in turn
apply the retaliatory law which is undoubtedly at his disposal,
and an unreasonable and unjust system of mutual retaliation may
be commenced which will do no good to anyone and result in
much harm to legitimate business. The purpose of these laws is to
equalize the amount of taxes which are required to be paid under
different state laws, and not to require the establishment of an
equal rate of taxation, or to insist upon the payment of additional amounts as penalties. 85
Because of the statutes' harsh retaliatory sanction they should be strictly construed and executed with care, or else mutual retaliation can result. It can be
forcibly argued that this requires a state to look fully into the burdens of the
other state to determine whether they are greater. Thus, all taxes, fees, fines,
84
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The system' adopted by Ohio in providing workmen's compensation is
based upon public policy aimed at furthering the social welfare of its workmen, and such policy has been recognized not to be an attempt to discriminate against foreign insurance companies, but as an equal prohibition
applicable to both foreign and domestic companies.

85 Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. State, 161 Wash. 135, 296 Pac. 813, 815-16
(1931). See supra note 60 for an ekample of mutual retaliation.
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penalties and other obligations, prohibitions and restrictions are to be taken
into consideration by the commissioner before imposing the retaliatory tax.
IV.

PERSPECTIVE:

RESULT, EVALUATION AND SUGGESTIONS

A. Survey
A short questionnaire was sent by the author to various insurance commissioners relative to the retaliatory laws of their states. The purpose was
to find out the basic operational principles of the statutes, current problems
in their application and opinions as to any uniformity in regulation they may
have achieved. Basically, the questions asked were:
(1) Whether there has been any significant difficulty in applying
your retaliatory statute to foreign insurance companies as a result
of different methods of taxation in their domiciliary state? (What
is intended is not variances in rates, but differences in rate application, as where the other state applies the tax on gross premiums
less claims paid, whereas the retaliating state may tax on the
basis of gross premiums.) (2) Whether the retaliatory statutes
have brought about any significant amount of uniformity between
the states relative to treatment of foreign insurance companies?
The result on question one was that eight states"5 reported difficulty compared with eleven"7 which experienced none. The states admitting to difficulty ranged from "some" in Louisiana and Missouri to "quite a bit" in
Florida. New Jersey Commissioner Howell stated that the statute is "most
difficult to administer but apparently is needed as a deterrent to increases in
the taxes imposed on premiums." The Illinois Department of Insurance says:
"There is always a certain amount of difficulty in determining the tax and
fees assessed by the various states, due to the constant changing of laws and
departmental rules." However, they feel that the tax reports required of foreign
insurance companies have achieved a relatively simple method of computing
retaliatory taxes. Pennsylvania said that the "aggregate principle" has caused
several problems. Washington reported that the greatest difficulty was in
keeping abreast of the changes in the insurance laws of the various states.
Ohio said that, along with other states, it experienced difficulty in applying retaliatory statutes, and currently, as a result of Indemnity Ins. Co. v.
Stowell,8" was faced with the problem of the level on which to retaliate - city,
county, or only state exactions. As the Stowell decision did not make this clear
the Ohio Insurance Department requested an opinion from the Attorney
General. The Attorney General's Opinion89 as rendered (discussed earlier)
covered only certain local impositions of New York and held that there should
not be retaliation for these. This was because New York either allowed the
items to be deducted from the retaliatory tax due or the premium tax.
The states which answered "no" to the question concerning difficulty
of administration generally qualified it by stating "no particular" or "no significant" difficulty. The reason most states gave for this lack of difficulty was
86
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the fact that foreign insurance companies were required to make a pro forma
tax return which takes into account the method of taxation in the domiciliary
state. This type of pro forma return varied considerably. The Massachusetts
form applied only to premium taxes and merely stated:
Here compute your excise by the identical method and at

the same rate used by the state of your incorporation in taxing
a like Massachusetts insurance company, or its agents, if doing
business to the same extent therein. If the computation is in every
respect as above (Massachusetts premium tax rate being 2%b),
a statement to that effect should be made.90
The Louisiana form, which was one of the most comprehensive of those
examined, provides separate forms for foreign life and nonlife insurance companies, and takes into consideration, when applicable, such factors as annuity
considerations, dividends to Louisiana policyholders, fire department taxes and
municipal taxes in determining total taxes and fees payable. Commissioner
Hayes of Louisiana said: "The determination of a Louisiana Retaliatory Tax
Liability is based upon the aggregate 'cost of doing business' rather than item
per item or fee per fee basis." After these forms are filed the computations
based on a similar company of the retaliatory state doing business in the
foreign state are checked against that state's laws.
Oklahoma, in reply to question one, said that because Oklahoma has a four
per cent basic premium tax it seldom has to retaliate and is generally retaliated
against. South Carolina also replied that it seldom applied its retaliatory statute
as its tax rate Was very near the maximum. It added that the statute was applied
to brokers' licenses but the total collected each year was not significant.
Earlier it was stated that a primary purpose of retaliatory statutes was reciprocity: We will treat your insurance companies as you treat ours. If reciprocity were refused and greater burdens imposed, these burdens would be matched
by the state in retaliation. The purpose of question two was to determine whether
the reciprocity had been accepted by other states; or, is there any apparent trend
towards uniformity between the states as to burdens imposed on foreign insurance
companies? Only two letters 1 replied that any uniformity had resulted from
the retaliatory statutes, while eleven said there was none, or at least no significant
92
uniformity.
Commissioner Knowlton of New Hampshire stated that retaliatory statutes
had the effect of pretty well keeping the tax rate constant at two per cent. The
reason for this was that state legislatures hesitate to raise the tax rate because they
know that domestic companies will be penalized by retaliation in other states. He
also said that the statutes were creating some uniformity in connection with the
deposit requirements of other states. The State Tax Assessor of Maine, Ernest H.
Johnson, who administers insurance taxes, said that he was of the opinion that a
"considerable degree of uniformity" has resulted from the statutes and gave the
same reason as Commissioner Knowlton.
90 Form 63-20-NF, Foreign Life Insurance Company Excise Return.
91 Maine and Missouri.
92 Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wyoming.
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The strongest statements against any resulting uniformity were those of the
Florida and New Jersey commissioners. Florida stated that rather than bringing
about any uniformity in the taxation of the various states, they have worked to
the contrary. Commissioner Howell of New Jersey replied:
Neither the retaliatory laws nor valiant efforts of a committee
of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners which struggled with this problem for several years have brought about any
uniformity in the tax laws of the several states. Commissioners and
those in Industry who have worked on this problem of uniformity
are convinced that it is a hopeless project.
Some of the other states denying any significant uniformity as the result of these
statutes did cite the trend towards uniformity in administration of security deposits. (This uniformity is gained by letting the state of incorporation handle
the deposit.) Louisiana reported that while some uniformity was seen, it was
difficult to tell from what source it stemmed. Arizona said that there was no
uniformity among the states.
B. Effectiveness
Because of legislative intent, judicial construction or restricted application
by the insurance commissioner the retaliatory statutes of several states are of
severely limited scope. In Idaho and New Mexico the retaliatory statutes apply
only to licenses for agents or brokers. The North Carolina statute, on the other
hand, is a comprehensive one, but because of another statute9 is rendered ineffective as to taxes, the item generally considered the most important in a retaliatory statute. Mississippi has an unusual statutory practice whereby credit is given
domestic companies for taxes paid under the retaliatory laws of other states.94
This statute takes away the desire of domestic insurers to keep the burdens on
foreign insurers at a minimum for retaliation in other states is no detriment to
them. The retaliatory statute in Alabama is considered unconstitutional due to
prior decisions and an opinion of the Attorney General.99
Some statutes are permissive, in that it is up to the discretion of insurance
commissioners to impose retaliation.99 While this eliminates the bothersome problem of having to retaliate on many small items it perhaps leaves too much to the
discretion of the busy insurance commissioner, who may find that no retaliation
is necessary.
The effectiveness of retaliatory statutes in those states having high burdens
is greatly limited, as they cannot retaliate but are generally retaliated against.
These are generally states with few domestic insurers and thus are not troubled
by the possibility of retaliation and can tax foreign insurers at high rates.
The practical effectiveness of the retaliatory statutes is largely dependent on
93 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-228.8 (1960).
94 MIss. CODE ANN. § 9537-04 (Supp. 1962). Mississippi does not have a retaliatory law.
95 See supra note 36.
96 Colorado, Kentucky, North Carolina and Washington. These statutes provide that the
insurance commissioner "may" impose the same burdens, whereas all other retaliatory statutes
read "shall" impose. However, the actions of the insurance commissioners show that "shall" is
not as imperative as it would seem. This is due to the difficulties of making any exacting comparison between the burdens of two states. An item which would not fit into an aggregate
comparison (for example, security deposits) may merely be considered as a factor in determining whether retaliation is proper.
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the degree of enforcement by insurance commissioners. Retaliation is sometimes
made only on the basis of the premium tax, giving little or no consideration to
other burdens. The comparison of burdens must be an exact one and all factors
should be taken into consideration.
C. Suggestions
The greatest problem with retaliatory statutes has been their application.
Ideally, the retaliatory statute should try to cover all possible areas of disagreement. Unfortunately, most statutes do not answer questions whether the commissioner is to consider municipal taxes, or what to do if other states allow
deductions not permitted in the retaliating state, or just how the respective
burdens are to be computed.
It is probable that the similar statutes of Arkansas, California, Florida,
Georgia, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota and Utah most completely cover the
possible problems that may arise. These statutes state that "the same taxes,
licenses and other fees, in the aggregate" and that the same "fines, penalties,
deposit requirements or other material obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions
of whatever kind, shall be imposed." This follows the procedure adopted by most
commissioners and courts, that is, grouping together in an aggregate figure for
comparative purposes the taxes and fees imposed by each state. Also, it allows
separate exaction and imposition of like fines, penalties, restrictions, etc., which
is the only practical way to compare and retaliate for these burdens. These
statutes specifically provide for what is to be done with taxes and fees other than
those levied by the state, i.e. city, county, etc. They are deemed imposed within
the meaning of the statute and will be considered together with taxes and fees.
However, the statute is not applicable to such taxes as personal income or ad
valorem, but deductions from premium taxes or other taxes allowed in the other
state "on account of real estate or personal property taxes paid" are to be considered in the determination of retaliatory action.
A further question solved by these statutes is whether there must be an insurance company of the retaliating state doing business in the other state. The
statutes cover exactions which "are or would be imposed" upon insurers of
this state.
The California statute varies somewhat as it has detailed provisions for filing
retaliatory tax information returns by insurance companies and the procedure to
be followed in assessing the returns for the imposition of retaliatory taxes. Most
states having retaliatory statutes require a foreign insurer to submit a retaliatory
tax form on which it computes the taxes and fees a company from the retaliatory
state doing a similar business in the state they are from (the foreign state) would
be required to pay. The California requirement of specifically putting this
burden on the foreign insurance companies prevents any dispute, although the
detailed procedural steps in the California statute would not be adaptable in
most states.

